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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EDDIE CLEGG,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20010440-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals his convictions based on conditional guilty pleas to possession of
a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (1998). See UTAH R. CRIM. P. ll(i)
(recognizing guilty plea conditioned upon right to appeal). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress without holding an
evidentiary hearing, where defendant placed no material fact in dispute and did not request
an evidentiary hearing prior to the court's ruling?
An appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on a

motion to suppress for abuse of discretion." United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408
(10th Cir. 1997). Accord United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300,311 (1st Cir. 1992) (addressing
the denial of an evidentiary hearing in the context of a criminal pretrial motion alleging a
conflict of interest).
CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY. AND RULE PROVISIONS
Resolution of this appeal involves the following provisions, which are reproduced in
Addendum A:
R. CRIM. P. 12 - Motions;
UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-102 - Law and Motion Calendar;
UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-501 - Motions.
UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following execution of a search warrant on defendant's trailer home, defendant was
charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony,
and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor
(R. 3-4,25-26). At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, defense counsel discussed his
intent to challenge the search warrant (R. 172: 20-21). The court ordered counsel to file his
motion to suppress within 30 days, allowed the prosecutor 15 days to respond, and ordered
the matter reassigned to another judge for "the exclusive purpose of ruling on the adequacy
or inadequacy of the search warrant" (id.).1
1

Initially, the parties believed that the preliminary hearing magistrate and trial
judge, Judge Lynn Davis, issued the warrant and, therefore, that the motion to suppress
needed to be re-assigned (R. 172: 21). Subsequently, it was determined that the warrant
was not issued by Judge Davis, who then ruled on the motion to suppress (R. 80, 86).
2

On March 30,2000, defendant filed an initial motion to suppress the evidence seized
pursuant to the search warrant and, a few days later, filed a supplemental motion to suppress
the evidence (R. 27-55). On April 13, 2000, the prosecutor filed a response in opposition
(R. 57-81). Defendant did not further respond or request an evidentiary hearing.
On October 5,2000, the court issued a written ruling denying the motion to suppress
(R. 82-86). See Addendum C (Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress). The court then
scheduled a pretrial conference and jury trial (R. 90-91).
On November 13, 2000, thirty-nine days after the motion to suppress was denied,
defendant, for thefirsttime, requested an evidentiary hearing claiming that the court's ruling
was "premature" (R. 92-94). See Addendum D (Defendant's Motion for Hearing on Motion
to Suppress). The court denied the request (R. 95-96). See Addendum E (Ruling on
Defendant s Request for Hearing).
On January 29, 2001, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to reduced charges
of third degree felony methamphetamine possession and class B misdemeanor possession of
drug paraphernalia (R. 110-12, 115-25). On April 16, 2001, he was sentenced to the
statutory terms of incarceration, which terms were suspended upon service of 120 days in
jail and payment of a fine (R. 130-34). Defendant timely appealed (R. 147).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The affidavit in support of the search warrant of defendant's trailer home established
that:

3

1. A confidential informant called the police and told them that he had
"information on several drug houses in the Provo area" (R. 31, T| 2); the
informant was familiar with methamphetamine use and distribution based on
his own "previous use of drugs" (R. 30, <| 5);
2. At the informant's direction, the police drove the informant to defendant's
trailer park where the informant identified trailer #13, defendant's trailer, as
a drug house (R. 30, ||f 3 & 7);
3. The informant told the police that he "had observed within the last 72 hours
in trailer #13, a plate containing a large amount of methamphetamine on it"
and had observed "the sell [sic] of methamphetamine from this trailer with in
[sic] the last 72 hrs." (R. 30,13);
4. The informant told the police that the drug sales occurred during the night
time hours with persons armed with handguns (R. 30, % 4); the observations
were consistent with established drug dealing (id.);
5. The informant told the police that vehicles came to the residence and stayed
for only a short period of time, an observation consistent with drug dealing (R.
30,1 8);
6. The police independently corroborated the informant's information by
seizing and searching a garbage can marked "13". . . "from off the street
directly in front" of trailer #13; inside the garbage can, the police found
"syringes, tinfoil containing resin, baggies with the comers removed,
reinforced tubing as well as correspondence indicating the name Eddie M.
Clegg;" the items found tested positive for amphetamines (R. 30, % 7);
7. The police independently confirmed that defendant Clegg had a "previous
history with the distribution of controlled substances" (R. 30, f 7).
See Addendum B (Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit).
Provo City Police Officer Dearden was the only witness called during the preliminary
hearing (R. 25-26). He participated in the warrant search of defendant's trailer and
discovered syringes, spoons, a straw, a knife with residue, a dinner plate with residue, and
a small baggy of methamphetamine (R. 172: 5-9). During the search, defendant told Dearden
4

that he "did not believe that he had any more drugs in the house, that he had used them all"
(R. 172: 11).
Officer Dearden testified that, prior to securing the search warrant, the informant told
him that he had purchased drugsfromdefendant inside the trailer within the preceding 72
hours (R. 172: 17).
Following the preliminary hearing, defendantfileda formal motion and memorandum
challenging the search warrant (R. 27-52). Defendant claimed that the affidavit in support
of the warrant did not establish probable cause to search (R. 47-48). He also argued that the
informant's information was not reliable or corroborated because: (1) the informant used
drugs, and (2) the evidence found in the garbage can search did not substantiate that
defendant was selling drags (R. 37-45). Finally, defendant asserted that the affidavit only
stated that the informant used drugs and observed drug sales, but did not reveal that the
informant had purchased drugs from defendant, as stated by Officer Dearden at the
preliminary hearing (R. 34-36). According to defendant, if this omitted information were
included in the affidavit, the reliability of the informant would be undermined and probable
cause would be lacking (R. 34). In his supplemental motion to suppress, defendant claimed
that before the evidence derived from the garbage can search could be included in the
affidavit, the prosecution was required to establish a "constitutionally recognized exception"
justifying the warrantless search (R. 53-55).
In a written response, the prosecution conceded that the informant purchased drugs
from defendant and that the police omitted this information in the affidavit (R. 80-81).
5

Nevertheless, the affidavit contained substantially equivalent information, to wit, that the
informant used drugs and was present during drug sales at defendant's trailer (R. 30,63,80).
The prosecutor argued that "even a prior drug user can be a citizen informer," meaning an
informant who voluntarily provides information to the police without receiving personal gain
in return (R. 60,69-70). As the prosecutor explained, the informant in this case was reliable
for several reasons:
First, the informant voluntarily initiated contact with the police. He was not
working for an agency, or police officer, as an informant. Second, he wanted
to voluntarily assist in shutting down the drug houses as he had a friend who
was dying from drug abuse and didn't want to see that happen anymore.
Third, he voluntarily met with the police, thus revealing his identity to them.
Fourth, he voluntarily took the police around the area and showed them houses
he knew of as being drug houses. Fifth, he voluntarily confessed to his use of
drugs, and having purchased drugs (at defendant's residence) in the past,
showing his utilitarian interest in supply sufficient information upon which the
police could take action. And, sixth, he received no benefit or otherwise for
providing information. He was not paid. He was not under indictment and
required to give information to work off charges.
(R. 69-70). In sum, the prosecutor argued that the affidavit contained all relevant material
facts; but even if the omitted fact were included ' he affidavit remained sufficient (R. 59-61).
Indeed, the omitted information - that defendani nad not just used drugs and observed drug
sales, but had also purchased drugs from defendant in the proceeding 72 hours - actually
"bolster[ed] the reliability of the information the informant provided the officer" (R. 60).
Defendant did not reply to the prosecutor's memorandum or request an evidentiary
hearing.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress in a written ruling (R. 82-86:

6

Addendum C). The court concluded that pursuant to State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 549550 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997), defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in trash left in a garbage can on the street for collection (R. 84).2
Additionally, because the evidence found in the garbage can search corroborated the
informant's first-hand observations of methamphetamine use and sales in the trailer, there
was little legal significance to the informant's designation as a citizen or police informant
(R. 83-84). Whatever his designation, it was undisputed that the informant initiated the
police contact, received no direct benefit for divulging his personal observations, and
voluntarily implicated himself in drug usage, therefore, the court found the informant's firsthand reports of drug sales reliable (R. 83).3 As to the information omitted from the affidavit
- that the informant had purchased drugs from defendant - the court concluded that even if
the omitted information were included in the affidavit, the affidavit was sufficient to support

2

The trial court's conclusion is correct. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S:
35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect trash left at
curbside outside a home). See also State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318,322 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998); Jackson, 937 P.2d at 549-50 (both holding that a
defendant has no expectation of privacy under the Utah Constitution in trash left near a
public street, "apparently for trash collection"). On appeal, defendant does not challenge
the merits of the trial court's legal ruling, but claims that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the underlying factual issue. See Brief of Appellant at 5.
3

The trial court's assessment of the reliability of the informant is consistent with
Utah precedent. See State v. DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, ^ 11-21, 40 P.3d 1136
(discussing factors to be considered in assessing the reliability of an informant). On
appeal, defendant does not challenge this portion of the ruling.
7

the issuance of the warrant (R. 83).4
Thirty-nine days later, defendant, for the first time, requested an evidentiary hearing
to determine if defendant's garbage can was "outside the residential curtilage" when searched
(R. 92-94: Addendum D). Defendant did not claim that the garbage can was in fact located
at a location different than that stated in the affidavit, but argued that the trial court's denial
of the motion to suppress was "premature" unless the prosecution, in an evidentiary hearing,
proved that "the facts surrounding the search of the residential garbage container... supports
a ruling that said search was legal under Greenwood and Jackson" (id.).
The trial court denied defendant's request. The court noted that a reviewing court is
only required to determine the sufficiency of a search warrant based on the facts alleged in
the affidavit (R. 95-96: Addendum E). In this case, the affidavit established that the garbage
can was retrieved "from off the street directly in front of the trailer" (R. 95; see also R. 30,
f 6: Addendum B). Since defendant did not allege any different fact, the court could make
its legal ruling without resort to an evidentiary hearing (R. 95).

4

The trial court's assessment of probable cause is consistent with Utah precedent.
See State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23,ffi|30-31, 996 P.2d 555, cert, denied, 9 P.3d
170 (Utah 2000); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 54-56 (Utah App. 1993) (both recognizing
that under State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987),
any alleged omitted material information must be included in the affidavit before
determining if the affidavit is supported by probable cause). See also State v. Norris,
2001 UT 104, f 14, 436 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (in determining if a search warrant is
supported by probable cause, the affidavit is read "in its entirety and in a common sense
fashion" with deference to the issuing magistrate's decision) (citation and quotation
marks omitted), cert, pending (2002). On appeal, defendant does not challenge this
portion of the trial court's ruling.
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant presumes that an evidentiary hearing is required to determine a motion to
suppress evidence. Defendant is incorrect. A motion to suppress is no different than any
other pretrial motion: if no material fact is in dispute, no evidentiary hearing is required.
In this case, there was no material disputed fact surrounding the garbage can search.
The affidavit specifically stated the location of the garbage can: it was on the street in front
of defendant's trailer. Since defendant never challenged the veracity of this statement, the
trial court reasonably concluded that no evidentiary hearing was required to determine the
legality of the warrantless search or any other legal issue raised in defendant's motion to
suppress.
ARGUMENT
,47V EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED IN RULING ON A
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ONLY WHEN A MATERIAL FACT IS IN
DISPUTE
Defendant presumes that an evidentiary hearing on a pretrial motion is the norm. It
is not. An evidentiary hearing is only required to resolve disputed material facts; if no
material fact is in dispute, an evidentiary hearing is not only not required, it is wasteful and
unnecessary. See United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408-09 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a defendant seeking a hearing "bears the burden of showing there are material facts in
dispute, and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises
factual allegations that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to
enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search
9

are in issue") (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accord United States v. Rodriguez,
69 F.3d 136, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant must allege a "prima facie
showing of illegality" before an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is required);
United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 311 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that if a defendant seeks
an evidentiary hearing on a pretrial motion, he must "make an adequate threshold showing
that material facts are in genuine doubt or dispute;" he "has no constitutional right to conduct
a fishing expedition"); Best v. United States, 582 A.2d 966,968 (D.C. 1990) (holding that
"allegations that are merely conclusional in support of a motion to suppress do not suffice
to obtain a hearing on the motion") (citation and quotation marks omitted); People v. Bonnet,
733 N.Y.S.2d 186,187 (N.Y. 2001) (same); State v. Tongue, 753 A.2d 356,358 (Vt. 2000)
(same). See also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that
"[i]t is self-evident that district courts are busy places and makework hearings are to be
avoided") (citation and quotation marks omitted); State v. Velez, 589 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Wis.
1999) (recognizing that judicial resources and time are wasted by "unnecessary evidentiary
hearings when there may be no disputed facts requiring resolution"). A trial court's
determination that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary is upheld on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion. Glass, 128 F.3d at 1408; Lilly, 983 F.2d at 311.
Defendant concedes that a trial court has discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing,
but claims that, in this case, the trial court erred because "whether the garbage can was on
the street or within the residential curtilage dispositively determines the constitutional
validity of the search under State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945
10

P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997)[,] and California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 ... (1988)." See Brief
of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 5. Defendant's legal statement is correct, but his underlying
factual premise - that the location of garbage can was "clearly disputed" - is mistaken. See
Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892,895 (Utah App. 1996) (recognizing that protesting a material
fact does not necessarily place it in dispute), cert denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997).
Utah law requires a motion to suppress to be supported by "precise averments, not
conclusory generalizations." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,78 (Utah App. 1990) (citing UTAH
R. CRIM. P. 12(a), which requires the grounds for a motion to be stated "with particularity").
Rule 12(a) and rules 4-102(2)(B) & 4-501(l)(A), UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
further require affidavits or other documents supporting the "precise averments" to be filed
with a motion or its supporting memorandum.5 Like the majority ofjurisdictions, Utah does
not require an evidentiary hearing to determine a motion unless a material fact is placed in
dispute; indeed, the assumption is that a "decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the court, or requested by the parties" in accordance with the rules.
See UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-501(3)(A).
Here, defendant placed no material fact in dispute. In his initial and supplemental
motions to suppress, defendant challenged: (1) the sufficiency of the affidavit to establish

5

Rule 4-501, entitled "Civil Practice," is applicable to criminal proceedings in the
absence of a specific rule governing criminal motion practice. See Utah R. Jud. Adm. 4501 ("Applicability: This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record
except proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief").
11

probable cause, (2) the reliability of the informant, and (3) whether an exception permitted
a warrantless search of a garbage can "situated at or near" the street (R. 27-55). The first and
third issues were legal questions and placed no material fact in dispute. In connection with
the second issue, the State admitted that the information gleaned from the preliminary
hearing - that the informant had not merely used drugs and observed drug sales in
defendant's trailer, but had also purchased drugs from defendant - was omitted from the
affidavit (R. 80). Thus, defendant's motion and the parties' memoranda did not place a
material fact in dispute and the trial court properly proceeded to rule on defendant's motion
without a hearing.
Defendant appears to concede the propriety of the trial court's initial ruling, but
claims that when he filed his request for an evidentiary hearing 39 days after the denial of
the motion to suppress, he "clearly disputed" the "fact that the garbage can was removed
from off the street as opposed to the curtilage of the residence" and, therefore, placed the fact
at issue. See Br.Aplt. at 5. The record does not support defendant's claim.6
In his request for hearing, defendant merely asserted that, to be lawfully searched
without a warrant, a garbage can must be "placed on the curb, outside of the residential
curtilage" and that until the Court "conducted a hearing to determine whether the evidence
supports a finding that the subject garbage container was outside of the residential curtilage,"
any ruling was "premature" (R. 92-93: Addendum D). Such general conjecture does not

6

Defendant's request for hearing was not timely, but the trial court denied it on
the merits (R. 82-86).
12

place a material fact in dispute. See Glass, 128 F.3d at 1408-09 (alleging that a seizure is
not supported by reasonable suspicion does not establish the need for an evidentiary
hearing); Rodriguez, 69 F.3d at 142 (speculating that an illegality occurred is insufficient to
justify an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d 259,261(10th Cir.
1995) (alleging that a roving patrol is illegal does not support the need for an evidentiary
hearing). Nor does such conclusory speculation provide a basis to question the validity of
the search warrant affidavit. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (holding
that a search warrant affidavit is accorded a "presumption of validity" and, therefore, in
requesting an evidentiary hearing, "the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and
must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine;" "[t]here must be
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations
must be accompanied by an offer of proof').
Moreover, in this case, the affidavit in support of the search warrant expressly
established the location of the garbage can:
Your affiant initiated an independent investigation that included, responding
to the address 1095 South 500 West, # 13 and retrieving the garbage can from
off the street directly infrontof the trailer. The garbage can had the numeral
indicators [sic] 13 painted in white paint on the front of the can.
(R. 30, U 6: Addendum B) (emphasis added). In his request for hearing, defendant did not
dispute the validity of this statement, he simply ignored it. Properly, the trial court did not.
The court concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine the location of
the garbage can because the unchallenged statement in the affidavit resolved the issue (R. 95:

13

Addendum E). See Lilly, 983 F.2d at 311 (concluding that a trial court's acceptance of
undisputed record facts is equivalent, as a practical matter, to granting an evidentiary
hearing). The trial court's decision was a proper exercise of its discretion.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly ruled on defendant's motion to suppress without holding an
evidentiary hearing because no material fact was in dispute. The trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress and defendant's resultant convictions pleas should be affirmed.
Because no Utah case expressly provides guidance to the trial courts in granting or
denying an evidentiary hearing in connection with a motion to suppress, the State requests
publication of this Court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^ l a y of April, 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 12. Motions.

(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion A motion other than one made during a tnal or
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it u
made and shall sat forth the relief sought. It may be supported
by affidavit or by evidence
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the tnal of the general issue may be
raised pnor to tnal by written motion The following shall be
raised at laast five days pnor to the tnal
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall
be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the
proceeding;
(2) motions to suppress evidence,
(3) requests for discovery where allowed,
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants, or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before
tnal unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be
deferred for later determination Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state IU
findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made pnor to
trial or at the tune set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall bt
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including
suchfindingsof fact and conclusions of law as are made orally
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable
and specified time ponding the filing of a new indictment or
information. Nothing in this rule snail be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4*102. Law and motion calendar.
Intent:
lb establish a uniform procedure of scheduling matters on
the law and motion calendar
lb establish uniform notice requirements and filing deadlines for law and motion matters
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil and criminal proceedings in
the District Court
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Law and motion matters
(A) In multi-judge districts, law and motion matters arising
in connection with a case which has been assigned for all
purposes to a particular judge shall be heard by the assigned
judge
(B) If the assigned judge is unavailable, the case shall not
be assigned or transferred to any other judge for handling
without the approval of the presiding judge
(2) Notice and filing requirements
(A) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring
written notice shall be heard only after written notice served
no less than five days prior to the date of the hearing, unless
the court for good cause shown orders the period of time for
notice of hearing shortened
(B) Affidavits in support of law and motion matters must be
filed with the motion or memorandum of points and authorities supporting or opposing the motion Other documents filed
in support of or in opposition to law and motion matters,
including returns of service on supplemental orders, orders to
show cause and bench warrants, must be filed in the clerk's
office at least two working days before the hearing on the
matter, together with a copy of the signed order showing the
date and time of the required appearance
(C) Proceedings based upon supporting documents which
are not filed in accordance with this rule may be dismissed
(3) Ex parte matters, stipulated matters and supplemental
proceedings
(A) Ex-parte matters based upon stipulations may be presented at any time to the assigned judge Proceedings on the
law and motion calendar involving the taking of evidence may
be heard after those not requiring the taking of evidence
Add-ons may be heard on the day set for hearing, provided
proper notice has been given and the convenience of the court
permits such hearing
(B) Motions for supplemental proceedings may be set on the
weekly supplemental proceedings calendar or before the judge
assigned to the case on the assigned judge's regular law and
motion calendar

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
lb establish a uniform procedure forfilingmotions, supporting memoranda and documents with the court.
lb establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability*.
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of
record except proceedings before the court commissioners and
small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except
uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits,
and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions
of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a
motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2),
except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte application.
If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length
memorandum, the application shall state the length of the
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in exeats
of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding
party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days
afterservice of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding
party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (1XD) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and
file a reply memorandum within five days after service of the
responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the
five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party may
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision.
The notification shall be in the form of a separate written
pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the
motion was served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if
any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties.
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted
for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue
exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue
exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of
the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.

(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the court, or requested by the
parties as provided in paragraphs (3XB) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose
of the action or any claim in the action on the merits with
prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may
file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds
that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or
(b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall
notify the requesting party. When a request for hearing is
granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the
requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those caaes where a hearing is granted, a courtesy
copy of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities
and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be
delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working
days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of
the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not befiledwith the clerk of
the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time
the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the
motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty
(30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive
motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the
court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving
party fails to file a memorandum in opposition, the moving
party may withdraw the request or the court on its own
motion may strike the request and decide the motion without
oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for
good cause shown, the court may grant a request for an
expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence
and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be
impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant
legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at
a party's request may direct arguments of any motion by
telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the
rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
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ORIGINAL
KAY BRYSON

UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 EAST CENTER STREET, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH 84601
PHONE: (801) 370-8026
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OP UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
A SEARCH WARRANT

Plaintiff,
-vs1095 South 500 West #13
PROVO, Utah

Criminal No.
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

:ss.
)

Comes now Ofc. Troy Beebe, having been duly sworn, who deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I am a law enforcement officer for the State of Utah, that I
am currently employed by the Provo Police Department, Uniform
Patrol Division, that I have received training through the
Utah State Police Academy and Provo City Police Department in
house academy, in investigations of Utah Criminal Code 58-378, Utah Control Substance Act.
That this training included
methods of use, sale, and distribution, cultivation,
manufacturing of controlled substances, identification of
controlled substances, as well as their appearance, odors and
street use. I have been a law enforcement officer for six
years. During this time I have investigated numerous cases
involving the use of Methamphetamine. I am currently certified
as a Drug Recognition Expert for the state of Utah. I also
have experience in serving high risk search warrants.

2.

On 11-22-99, at approximately 0345 hrs Your Affiant and
Officer Dearden received a call from a citizen informant,
who stated that he had information on several drug houses
in the Provo area.

Your Affiant and Officer Dearden drove with the citizen
informant to the address of 1095 South 500 West trailer #13.
The citizen informant stated that he h, d observed within the
last 72 hrs in trailer #13, a plate containing a large
amount of methamphetamine on it. Informant seated that he had
observed the sell of methampetamines from thi*: trailer with in
the last 72 hrs.
Citizen informant stated that the sales of methamphetamine
were taking place during the night time hours. The citizen
informant also stated that while he was at trailer #13
individuals coming to the trailer would be armed with firearms
(hand guns) secreted on their person. In your Affiants
experience with the service of search warrants I have found
that, it has become the rule rather than the exception that
individuals will arm themselves with guns to protect
themselves from Law Enforcement and the criminal element.
The citizen informant is familiar with the distribution, and
use of methamphetamine and other controlled substances, due to
the informants previous use of drugs.
Your Affiant initiated an independent investigation that
included, responding to the address 1095 South 500 West #13
and retrieving the garbage can from off the street directly in
front of the trailer. The garbage can had the numeral
indicators 13 painted in white paint on the front of the can.
Officers Dearden, Barney and I found in the can several items
of paraphernalia to include syringes, tinfoil containing
resin, baggies with the corners removed, reinforced tubing as
well as correspondence indicating the name Eddie M. Clegg. The
items were located near the middle of the can in a plastic
garbage bag .along with the correspondence. The plastic garbage
bag was consistent with other bags of garbage in the can. The
items field tested possitive for Amphetamines. Affiant also,
ran a criminal history on the Eddie M. Clegg which
indicated that Mr. Clegg had a previous history with the
distribution of controlled substances.
The citizen also stated to Officer Dearden that he observed
several vehicle's come to the residence and leave after a very
short time.
This would be consistent with Affiant's
experience in investigating Drug distribution. Individuals
buying and selling Methamphetamine will conceal the items on
their person and use vehicle's to transport Paraphernalia and
Narcotics to and from their residence.
That failure to
search individuals arriving to and from the residence as
well as the vehicle's associated with these individuals will
cause for evidence sought to be damaged, destroyed,
secreted, or otherwise altered.

9.

Affiant
expects
to
locate
the
following
items;
Methamphetamine, other controlled substances, Paraphernalia to
include but not limited to buy/owe sheets, correspondence
showing ownership, electronic messaging devices, pipes,
baggies, packaging materials, scales, cash, and weapons used
in the use/distribution of controlled substances.

10.

Residence is more particularly described as a single family
dwelling constructed of white siding having the front door
facing North. The trailer is located in the South East portion
of the trailer court. The trailer has a covered porch on the
North side that leads to and covers the front door. There is
a camper shell in the driveway just North of the trailer as
well as a shed to the rear of the trailer on the East side.

Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by
this court authorizing a search of 1095 South 500 West #13 Provo
Utah, and ajacent structures on the property,
as well as
individuals arriving to and from the residence in vehicle's that by
indication or use, are associated with this residence for the
presence of the following items; Methaxt?)hetamine, other controlled
substances, Paraphernalia to include but not limited to buy/owe
sheets, correspondence showing ownership, electronic massaging
devices, pipes, baggies, packaging materials, scales, cash, and
weapons used in the use/distribution of controlled substances.
Dated this day of 23th day of November^ 1999. 01Z& .m.

r

scribed and sworn befo
m.
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ORIGINAL
KAY BRYSON

UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 EAST CENTER STREET, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH 84601
PHONE: (801) 370-8026
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

SEARCH WARRANT

-vs1095 South 500 West #13
PROVO UT
NARCOTIC INVESTIGATION
Criminal No.
Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANT PEACH OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
It has been established by oath or affirmation made or
submitted to me this 23th day of November, 1999, that
there is probable cause to believe the following:
1.

That the property described below
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed.
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of
an offense.
is evidence of illegal conduct.

2.

That the property described below is most probably
located at the premises also set forth below.

3.

That the person or entity in possession of the
property is a party to the alleged illegal conduct.

4.

That this warrant may be served during the
nighttime hours, as the objects sought may be
easily destroyed, damaged, secreted, or otherwise
altered if the execution of the warrant is delayed.

NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OP YOU, are hereby directed to
conduct a search of the residence more particularly described as a
single family dwelling constructed of white siding having the front
door facing North. Trailer is located in the South East portion of
the trailer court. The trailer has a covered porch on the North
side that leads and covers the front door. There is a camper
trailer in the driveway just North of the trailer as well as a shed
to the rear of the trailer on the East side.
You are hereby directed to search the presence of the
following property for:
Methamphetamine, other controlled
substances, Paraphernalia to include pipes, buy/owe sheets,
correspondence showing ownership, cash, weapons, and other items
indicative of Methamphetamine use/distribution.
IP YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above Court, or to hold the
same in your possession, pending further order of this Court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found, or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant, you
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me,
her with a written inventory of any property seized,
ifying the place where the property is being held.
THIS WARRANT HAY BE SERVED DURING THE NIGHTTIME HOURS.

THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITH OUT PRIOR NOTICE OF
INTENT.
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
ISSUANCE.
^^^Xi
Dated this 24th day of M^yf, 1999yA 7/^ffim.

DISTRICT "JUDGE
/dr

Addendum C

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. -99*469?!
DATE: October 5, 2000

EDDIE CLEGG

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
Defendant.

CLERK: LG

Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, together with a supporting Memorandum on
March 30, 2000. A Supplemental Motion to Suppress was filed on April 5, 2000. The State
of Utah filed "Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress" on April 13, 2000.
On March 27, 2000, a preliminary hearing was conducted. Defense counsel
indicated a Motion to Suppress would be filed. There was some discussion at that time that
this judge, acting as magistrate, had signed the subject search warrant and that the case would
need to be reassigned. Somehow this case got lost in the shuffle. The court has now
determined that the warrant was signed by Ray Harding Sr., and now this judge can rule on
the Motion to Suppress.
After careful review of the memoranda, the court finds and rules as follows:
I
FACTS
1. On 11/22/99, at about 3:30 a.m., the Affiant and Officer Dearden received a call
from a citizen who wanted to provide information on drug houses in the Provo City area.
(Affidavit, paragraph #2)
2. The Affiant and Officer Dearden met with the informant and the informant
voluntarily took the officers and pointed out the defendant's residence as one of the drug
house, located at 1095 South 500 West trailer #13. (Paragraph 3 of the affidavit)

1

3. The informant told the officer that he had been in the residence, within the last 72
hours, and had seen drug transactions occurring therein, and had observed the purchase of
drugs within the last 72 hours. (Paragraph #3 of the affidavit)
4. The informant told the officer that he had viewed a plate containing a large
amount of methamphetamine in the residence within the last 72 hours. (Paragraph #3 of the
affidavit)
5. The informant told the officer that drug sales at the residence were taking place at
night. (Paragraph #3 of the affidavit)
6. The informant told the officer that those purchasing drugs were generally in
possession of firearms. (Paragraph #4 of the affidavit)
7. The officer undertook an independent investigation to verify the information by
doing a "trash cover" search. (Paragraph #6 of affidavit)
8. The Affiant went to the subject address, 1095 South 500 West #13 and retrieved
the garbage can on the street directly in front of the trailer. The garbage can had the numeral
indicators 13 painted in white paint on the front of the can. (Paragraph #6 of the affidavit)
9. In the search to the garbage, the officer located drug paraphernalia, specifically
syringes and tin foil containing resin, and baggies with corners cut off. The items tested
positive for amphetamine (Paragraph #7 of affidavit). The items of paraphernalia were located
in a plastic garbage bag near the middle of the can. Within that same bag was located
correspondence indicating the name of Eddie M. Clegg. (Paragraph #7 of the affidavit)
10. A criminal history was run on the name of Eddie M. Clegg which indicated that
he had a criminal history of distribution of controlled substances.

n
ISSUES
1. In his Supplemental Memorandum, the defendant objects to the search and seizure
of evidence from a garbage container situated at or near 1095 South 500 West, #13, Provo,
Utah.

2

2. Were the factual assertions set forth in the affidavit sufficient for the magistrate to
conclude that there was a fair probability contraband would be found in the premises situated
at 1095 South 500 West, #13, Provo, Utah.

m
LEGAL DISCUSSION

A . Trash Can Search
While defendant challenges the trash can search, the Utah Court of Appeals in the
case of State v. Jackson. 937 P.2d 545, ruled that there is no federal constitutionally protected
interest in garbage left for street side collection. The court declined to read Article 1, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart. It is therefore the
position of this court that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage. This Judge
was the trial judge in Jackson.
The Jackson search warrant affidavit, like here, relied upon the garbage search and
the discovery of drug residue and paraphernalia. The ultimate issue of whether Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords greater protections to residential garbage placed on
the street for collection than would be available under the Federal Fourth Amendment, has not
been ruled on. Nonetheless, certiorari was denied in Jackson. 937 P.2d 545, suggesting that
the Utah Supreme Court would not disturb the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
B. The Sufficiency pf the Affidavit
The affidavit sets forth the Affiant's training, the contact from the informant, the
follow up from that contact, the attempt to corroborate drug activity through the garbage can
search, the extensive evidence discovered in the garbage can search and the criminal history of
the defendant.
In reading the affidavit in its entirety and in a common sense fashion, it is the
opinion of the court that with the facts presented, the magistrate had a "substantial basis for
concluding that there were enough facts within the affidavit to find probable cause existed.
State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 991).
Since officers corroborated information through the garbage can search, which
resulted in significant evidence, the general dichotomy of "citizen informant7"police
3

informant" is not as crucial as cases without corroboration. But it is well to note that this
informant:
1. approached the police voluntarily by telephone;
2. voluntarily agreed to meet with the police and to identify himself;
3. voluntarily accompanied police officers and identified "drug houses;"
4. was not the focus of criminal investigation;
5. did not receive compensation for involvement or other benefit in exchange for
voluntarily providing information; and
6. was not working for the officers and did not participate in a controlled buy, etc.
The defendant also argues that there were material omissions of factsfromthe affidavit
that if included would have affected the magistrate's finding of probable.cause. He contends that
had the magistrate known that the citizen informant had purchased drugs himselffromthis
residence that such information would have cast doubt on the veracity and reliability of the citizen
informant's statements. However, veracity and reliability are only two relevant factors when
determining probable cause for issuance of a warrant. Furthermore, under the totality of the
circumstances, it seems clear that the affidavit establishes probable cause even if the omitted facts
concerning the citizen informant are added. Nor does the addition of those facts seriously
undercut the citizen informant's credibility so as to necessitate excision of his statement in the
entirety. Utah courts have held that personal observation or participation in an activity is enough
to establish knowledge of the activity. State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).
Furthermore, the fact that the officer searched the garbage cans and found drug paraphernalia
lends credence to the citizen informant's recent observation of defendant's drug sales and
possession.
It seems clear that the affidavit in question provided a sufficient basis for the issuance of
a search warrant in this case. Furthermore, the affidavit was not invalid due to the omitted
information concerning the citizen informant.

4

IV
RULING
This court has concluded reading the affidavit in its entirety, that there was a substantial
basis for concluding there were sufficient facts presented within the affidavit for the issuing
magistrate tofindprobable cause.
Secondly, the court has concluded that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
does not afford constitutionally protected rights to garbage left at curbside.
Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. Counsel for the State is
instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling. The Clerk of the Court is invited to
schedule this case, forthwith, for further proceedings.
Dated and signed this 5

day of October, 2000.
BYTHE^OURT

cc:

Curtis Larson, Esq.
Thomas H. Means, Esq.

*E&8?
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4<" DiS'"lCTCuwRT
STATE o? UTAM
UTAH C V J N T Y

Nov 13
THOMAS H. MEANS
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Defendant
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah, 84601
(801)379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
••*•••**

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

CASE NUMBER: 991404971

)

MOTION FOR HEARING ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.

)

EDDIE CLEGG,

)
Hon. Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

)

COMES NOW, Defendant, EDDIE CLEGG, by and through his
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to Rule 12 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, who hereby moves for this
Court's Order that a hearing be held on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress for the following reasons:
1.

Defendant has previously filed his Motion to

Suppress challenging the issuance of a search warrant allowing
for a search of a residence situated at 1095 South 500 West, #13,
Provo, Utah.

Ci

2.

Additionally, Defendant filed a Supplemental Motion

to Suppress challenging the warrantless search of a garbage can
situated at the same location.
3.

By Ruling dated 5 October, 2000, this Court denied

both of Defendant's motions. In so doing the Court, relying on
State v Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Ut. Ct. App., 1997), ruled that
the legality of warrantless searches of garbage cans has already
been determined under both the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of Utah.
4.

Defendant recognizes that warrantless searches of

residential garbage cans left at the curbside, outside of the
curtilage, is allowable under either a Fourth Amendment (see
California v Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988)) or an Article I Section
14 analysis. However, under either constitutional analysis such
searches are legal only if the garbage can was placed on the
curb, outside of the residential curtilage. Conversely, a search
of the same garbage can conducted by officers who have entered
the residential curtilage are not allowed by either Greenwood or
Jackson.
5.

Consequently, even though the Court has ruled the

police search of the residential garbage container in this case

2
r* n

legal, Defendant asserts that such ruling is premature until and
unless this Court has conducted a hearing to determine whether
the evidence supports a finding that the subject garbage
container was outside of the residential curtilage at the time of
the search.
For the foregoing reasons Defendant requests a hearing
to determine if the facts surrounding the search of the
residential garbage container involved in this matter supports a
ruling that said search was legal under Greenwood and Jackson.
Dated this November 10, 2000.
/

r

^

Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Eddie Clegg
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

j~%

day of November,

2000, I personally mailed or delivered a copy of the foregoing to
the following:
Carlyle K. Bryson
Utah County Attorney
150 East Center
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah, 84601

•2 C/^
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FILED/(^'^
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. State of Utah

OARMA B. SMfiH Deputv
Clerk
.
,4-:
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON DEFENDANTS
REQUEST FOR HEARING ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff

vs.

CASE NO. 991404971
DATE: NOVEMBER 17,2000

EDDIE CLEGG

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

Defendant.

CLERK: SGJ
On November 13,2000, defendant filed a "Motion for Hearing on Motion to Suppress" seeking
an evidentiary hearing before the Court. Defendant previously filed his Motion to Suppress challenging the
issuance of a search warrant allowing for a search of a residence. This Court issued its ruling on October
5,2000, sustaining the issuance of the search warrant, and, therefore, denying the Motion to Suppress.
Defendant now seeks an evidentiary hearing, claiming that the ruling on his motion was
premature until, through an evidentiary hearing, the Court established the facts of the case.
I.
DISCUSSION
It is the understanding of this Court that a judge who reviews the issuance of a search warrant
must:
•

apply a 'totality of the circumstance" test;

•

consider the affidavit in support of the issuance of die warrant, in its entirety and in a
common sense fashion;

•

give "great deference" to the issuing magistrate;

•

determine as a matter of law whether the issuing magistrate lacked a "substantial basis"
for determining that probable cause existed.

In this consideration die reviewing court may delete or dedact irrelevant factors in the affidavit,
but cannot ignore relevant factors. A reviewing Court does not conduct a separate evidentiary hearing to
determine the validity of each supporting paragraph. The Court can only entertain legal arguments
regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit. The Court must simplyreviewthe documents as presented to the

~*£

issuing magistrate. The issuing magistrate, Ray M. Harding, Sr., reviewed die affidavit in support of the
search wan at, found it sufficient to establish probable cause, and issued the search warrant.
This Court, giving deference to the issuing magistrate, after reviewing the entire affidavit,
sustained the issuance and denied the motion to suppress. Defendant now claims that this Court issued its
ruling prematurely because no evidentiary hearing was conducted to establish or refute the information
contained within the affidavit in support of the search warrant. Specifically, defendant claims that the
Court must establish through hearing whether the garbage can which was searched was located within the
curtilage of the residence or whether it was placed on the curb, outside of the residential curtilage.
Paragraph 6 of the affidavit provides:
'Tour Affiant initiated an independent investigation that included, responding to the
address 1095 South 500 West #13 and retrieving die garbage can from off the street
directly in front of the trailer. The garbage can had die numeral indicators 13 painted
m white paint on the front of the can." (emphasis added)
The magistrate relied upon the language of paragraph 6 in the affidavit as presented. It is not
the duty, burden or responsibility of die reviewing judge to consider facts or information not presented to
the issuing judge, absent fraud or very unusual circumstances. This Court makes a legal determination of
the sufficiency of the affidavit as presented.
DECISION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied. A
record has been made and this decision is, of course, subject to appellate scrutiny.
Dated this / 7 day of November, 2000.

cc:

Curtis Larson, Esq.
Thomas Means, Esq.
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